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"Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus"
-- Robert Kagan
The London Sunday Times --- February 02, 2003
Robert Kagan, an American historian, is influencing policy on both sides of the Atlantic with this controversial and iconoclastic analysis of what has gone wrong between Europe and the US. Robert Kagan is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served in the US State Department from 1984 to 1998. His original essay on Paradise and Power appeared in the journal Policy Review last year.
Extracted from Of Paradise and Power by Robert Kagan
Just over 350 years ago the political theorist Thomas Hobbes was so appalled by the chaos in England during the civil war that he wrote a book, Leviathan, denouncing mankind's anarchic and murderous instincts. He famously warned his countrymen that unless they obeyed one powerful central authority, life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short".
A century and a half later, as the aftermath of the French revolution shook Europe, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote an equally famous pamphlet called Towards a Perpetual Peace. He suggested that a stable universal order could gradually be achieved through a league of enlightened republics that banded together as modern history worked itself out.
Between these two visions of how to stop mankind tearing itself apart - power and enlightenment - America and Europe are divided today as they argue over the fate of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.
Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and co-operation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realisation of Kant's "perpetual peace".
Americans do not believe we are as close to the realisation of the Kantian dream as do Europeans. One of the things that most clearly divides them is where exactly mankind stands on the continuum between the laws of the jungle and the laws of reason.
The United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.
To put it another way, on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: they agree on little and understand one another less and less.
When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defence policies, America and Europe have parted ways. It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.
It is easier to see the contrast as an American living in Europe, as I have been. At their most extreme, Europeans depict an America dominated by a "culture of death", its warlike temperament the natural product of a violent society where every man has a gun and the death penalty reigns.
Even those who do not make this crude link argue that America resorts to force more quickly and, compared with Europe, is less patient with diplomacy. Americans generally see the world divided between good and evil, between friends and enemies, while Europeans see a more complex picture. When confronting real or potential adversaries, Americans generally favour policies of coercion rather than persuasion.
Americans want problems solved, threats eliminated. And, of course, Americans increasingly tend towards unilateralism. They are less inclined to act through international institutions such as the United Nations, less inclined to work co-operatively with other nations to pursue common goals, more sceptical about international law, and more willing to operate outside its strictures.
Europeans insist they approach problems with greater nuance and sophistication. They try to influence others subtly and indirectly. They are more patient when solutions don't come quickly. They generally favour peaceful responses to problems. They are quicker to appeal to international law, international conventions and international opinion to adjudicate disputes. They try to use commercial and economic ties to bind nations together. They often emphasise process over result, believing that ultimately process can become substance.
Of course, one cannot generalise. The British may have a more "American" view of power than many Europeans on the Continent. Nor can one simply lump French and Germans together: the first proud and independent but also surprisingly insecure, the second mingling self-confidence with self-doubt since the end of the second world war.
...
Despite what many Europeans and some Americans believe, these differences in strategic culture do not spring naturally from their national characters.
....
Europe, because of its unique historical experience of the past century culminating in the creation of the European Union, has developed a set of ideals and principles regarding the utility and morality of power different from those of Americans.
The first world war devastated Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia and destroyed the will and spirit of Britain and France, at least until the British rallied against Hitler. The second world war then all but destroyed European nations as global powers. They were now dependent on America, for their own security and for global security.
America's cold war strategy was built around the transatlantic alliance. Naturally, this elevated the importance of European opinion on global matters, giving both Europeans and Americans a perhaps exaggerated estimation of European power.
-- Robert Kagan
The London Sunday Times --- February 02, 2003
Robert Kagan, an American historian, is influencing policy on both sides of the Atlantic with this controversial and iconoclastic analysis of what has gone wrong between Europe and the US. Robert Kagan is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served in the US State Department from 1984 to 1998. His original essay on Paradise and Power appeared in the journal Policy Review last year.
Extracted from Of Paradise and Power by Robert Kagan
Just over 350 years ago the political theorist Thomas Hobbes was so appalled by the chaos in England during the civil war that he wrote a book, Leviathan, denouncing mankind's anarchic and murderous instincts. He famously warned his countrymen that unless they obeyed one powerful central authority, life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short".
A century and a half later, as the aftermath of the French revolution shook Europe, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote an equally famous pamphlet called Towards a Perpetual Peace. He suggested that a stable universal order could gradually be achieved through a league of enlightened republics that banded together as modern history worked itself out.
Between these two visions of how to stop mankind tearing itself apart - power and enlightenment - America and Europe are divided today as they argue over the fate of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.
Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and co-operation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realisation of Kant's "perpetual peace".
Americans do not believe we are as close to the realisation of the Kantian dream as do Europeans. One of the things that most clearly divides them is where exactly mankind stands on the continuum between the laws of the jungle and the laws of reason.
The United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.
To put it another way, on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: they agree on little and understand one another less and less.
When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defence policies, America and Europe have parted ways. It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.
It is easier to see the contrast as an American living in Europe, as I have been. At their most extreme, Europeans depict an America dominated by a "culture of death", its warlike temperament the natural product of a violent society where every man has a gun and the death penalty reigns.
Even those who do not make this crude link argue that America resorts to force more quickly and, compared with Europe, is less patient with diplomacy. Americans generally see the world divided between good and evil, between friends and enemies, while Europeans see a more complex picture. When confronting real or potential adversaries, Americans generally favour policies of coercion rather than persuasion.
Americans want problems solved, threats eliminated. And, of course, Americans increasingly tend towards unilateralism. They are less inclined to act through international institutions such as the United Nations, less inclined to work co-operatively with other nations to pursue common goals, more sceptical about international law, and more willing to operate outside its strictures.
Europeans insist they approach problems with greater nuance and sophistication. They try to influence others subtly and indirectly. They are more patient when solutions don't come quickly. They generally favour peaceful responses to problems. They are quicker to appeal to international law, international conventions and international opinion to adjudicate disputes. They try to use commercial and economic ties to bind nations together. They often emphasise process over result, believing that ultimately process can become substance.
Of course, one cannot generalise. The British may have a more "American" view of power than many Europeans on the Continent. Nor can one simply lump French and Germans together: the first proud and independent but also surprisingly insecure, the second mingling self-confidence with self-doubt since the end of the second world war.
...
Despite what many Europeans and some Americans believe, these differences in strategic culture do not spring naturally from their national characters.
....
Europe, because of its unique historical experience of the past century culminating in the creation of the European Union, has developed a set of ideals and principles regarding the utility and morality of power different from those of Americans.
The first world war devastated Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia and destroyed the will and spirit of Britain and France, at least until the British rallied against Hitler. The second world war then all but destroyed European nations as global powers. They were now dependent on America, for their own security and for global security.
America's cold war strategy was built around the transatlantic alliance. Naturally, this elevated the importance of European opinion on global matters, giving both Europeans and Americans a perhaps exaggerated estimation of European power.
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After the cold war there was the early promise of the "new" Europe. By bonding together into a single political and economic unit - the historic accomplishment of Maastricht in 1992 - many hoped to recapture Europe's old greatness but in a new political form. Instead, many Europeans took the end of the cold war as a holiday from strategy. The 1990s witnessed not the rise of a European superpower but the further decline of Europe into relative military weakness compared with America.
The sizeable American military arsenal, once barely sufficient to balance Soviet power, was now deployed in a world without a single formidable adversary. Thanks to the new technologies, America was also freer to use force in more limited ways through air and missile strikes, which it did with increasing frequency.
One British critic of America's propensity to military action recalls the old saw: "When you have a hammer, all problems start to look like nails." This is true. But nations without great military power face the opposite danger: when you don't have a hammer, you don't want anything to look like a nail.
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One explanation of Europe's greater tolerance for threats today is its relative weakness. A man armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger, because hunting it with a knife is riskier than lying low and hoping it never attacks. The same man armed with a rifle, however, will likely make a different calculation.
This perfectly normal human psychology has driven a wedge between America and Europe. Americans could imagine successfully invading Iraq and toppling Saddam, and therefore by the end of 2002 more than 70% of them favoured doing so. Europeans found the prospect both unimaginable and frightening.
It is not just that Europeans and Americans have not shared the same view of what to do about a specific problem such as Iraq. They do not share the same broad view of how the world should be governed, about the role of international institutions and international law, about the proper balance between the use of force and the use of diplomacy in international affairs.
...
The present transatlantic tensions did not begin with the inauguration of George W Bush. Today many Europeans view the Clinton years as a time of transatlantic harmony, but it was during those years that Europeans first began complaining about American power and arrogance in the post-cold-war world.
Europeans were appalled when administration officials in 1997 began suggesting that the economic sanctions placed on Iraq after the Gulf war could not be lifted while Saddam remained in power. They believed, in classically European fashion, that Iraq should be offered incentives for better behaviour, not threatened, in classically American fashion, with more economic or military coercion.
When the Clinton administration tried to increase the pressure on Baghdad to co-operate with United Nations arms inspectors at the end of 1997, France joined Russia and China in blocking the American proposals in the UN security council. When the Clinton administration finally turned to the use of military force and bombed Iraq in 1999, it did so without security council authorisation and with only Britain by its side.
In its waning months, the Clinton administration continued to believe that "Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, remains dangerous, unreconstructed, defiant and isolated". It would "never be able to be rehabilitated or reintegrated into the community of nations" with Saddam in power.
This was not the view of France or most of the rest of Europe. The rehabilitation and reintegration of Saddam's Iraq were precisely what they sought.
The European emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism represents a conscious rejection of the evils of European power politics.
The German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, has described "the core of the concept of Europe" as "a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states".
Of course, it was the "hegemonic ambitions" of one nation in particular, Germany, that European integration was meant to contain. And the taming and integration of Germany is the great accomplishment of Europe - viewed historically, perhaps the greatest feat of international politics ever achieved.
Some Europeans recall the central role America played in solving the "German problem". Fewer like to recall that the military destruction of Nazi Germany was the prerequisite for the European peace that followed. Instead, most Europeans like to believe that it was the transformation of the European mind and spirit that made possible the "new order". The Europeans, who invented power politics, turned themselves into born-again idealists by an act of will.
....
Many Europeans, including many in positions of power, routinely apply Europe's experience to the rest of the world, sometimes with the evangelical zeal of converts.
The general European critique of the American approach to "rogue" regimes is based on this special insight. Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya - these states may be dangerous and unpleasant, and even, if simplistic Americans insist, evil. But Germany was "evil" once, too. Might not an "indirect approach" work again, as it did in Europe? Might it not be possible once more to move from confrontation to rapprochement, beginning with co-operation in the economic sphere and then moving on to peaceful integration? Could not the formula that worked in Europe work again with Iran? Might it have even worked with Iraq? A great many Europeans have insisted that it might, and at less cost and risk than war.
The transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe's new civilising mission. Just as Americans have always believed they had discovered the secret of human happiness and wished to export it to the rest of the world, so the Europeans have a new mission born of their own discovery of perpetual peace.
America's power and its willingness to exercise it - unilaterally if necessary - constitute a threat to Europe's new sense of mission. Perhaps it is the greatest threat.
American policymakers have found it hard to believe, but leading officials and politicians in Europe really have worried more about how America might handle or mishandle the problem of Iraq - by undertaking unilateral and extralegal military action - than they have ever worried about Iraq itself and Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. American action, even if successful, would be an assault on Europe's new ideals, a denial of their universal validity.
As Americans have for two centuries, Europeans speak with great confidence of the superiority of their global understanding, the wisdom they have to offer other nations about conflict resolution, and their way of addressing international problems. But there is a hint of insecurity in the European claim to "success", an evident need to have their success affirmed and their views accepted by other nations, particularly by America.
To deny the validity of the new European idealism is to raise profound doubts about the viability of the European project. If international problems cannot, in fact, be settled the European way, wouldn't that suggest that Europe itself might eventually fall short of a solution, with all the horrors this implies? This situation abounds in ironies. Europe's rejection of power politics and its devaluing of military force as a tool of international relations have depended on the presence of American military forces on European soil. American power made it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important.
And now, in the final irony, the fact that American military power has solved the European problem, especially the "German problem", allows Europeans today, and Germans in particular, to believe that American military power, and the "strategic culture" that has created and sustained it, is outmoded and dangerous.
Most Europeans do not see or do not wish to see the great paradox: that their passage into "post-history" has depended on America not making the same passage. Because Europe has neither the will nor the ability to guard its own paradise and keep it from being overrun by a world that has yet to accept the rule of "moral consciousness", it has become dependent on America's willingness to use its own military might to deter or defeat those around the world who still believe in power politics.
...
America is already operating according to Cooper's double standards, trying to abide by, defend and further the laws of advanced civilised society while simultaneously employing military force against those who refuse to abide by those rules.
American leaders believe that global security and a liberal order - as well as Europe's "postmodern" paradise - cannot long survive unless America uses its power in the dangerous world that still flourishes outside Europe.
What this means is that although America has played the critical role in bringing Europe into its paradise, and still plays a key role in making that paradise possible, it cannot enter this paradise itself. It mans the walls but cannot walk through the gate. The United States, with all its vast power, remains stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the Kim Jong-ils, leaving most of the benefits to others.
To those of us who came of age in the cold war, the strategic decoupling of Europe and America seems frightening. If Americans were to decide that Europe was no more than an irritating irrelevancy, would American society gradually become unmoored from what we now call the West? It is not a risk to be taken lightly, on either side of the Atlantic.
So what is to be done? The obvious answer is that Europe should build up its military capabilities, even if only marginally. There is not much ground for hope that this will happen. But who knows? Maybe concern about America's overweening power really will create some energy in Europe.
It would be better still if Europeans could move beyond fear and anger at the rogue colossus and remember, again, the vital necessity of having a strong, even predominant America - for the world and especially for Europe. It would seem to be an acceptable price to pay for paradise.
© Robert Kagan 2003
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